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Police Corruption Control in
Hong Kong and New York City:
A Dilemma of Checks and Balances in Combating
Corruption
Jinhua Chengg
I. INTRODUCTION
Police corruption, the abuse of public power by police officers for
their own profits, is a universal problem and one of the most notorious
obstacles in the way of good governance.1 Furthermore, given the fact
that police officers are located in urban areas in most countries, police
corruption is a big problem for municipal governance.2 Correspondingly,
the control of police corruption has been a tough issue in city politics,
even within democracies.3
With respect to police corruption control in cities, this paper will
discuss the following questions: Why have some city governments
effectively changed the equilibrium of corruption and built up a new
equilibrium of integrity within the police force, while others have failed
to do so? In particular, why have some undemocratic municipal

* Associate Professor, School of Economic Law, East China University of Political Science & Law;
J.S.D. candidate, Yale; L.L.M, Yale, 2007. This paper is a contribution to the program of Building
the Third-Term Shanghai Municipal Key Disciplines (Economic Law, No. S30902). My idea on this
comparative study was initially suggested by Prof. Susan Rose-Ackerman when I took her class of
“Corruption, Democracy, and Economic Development” at the Yale Law School. Prof. RoseAckerman also gave her enormous help to improve this paper with her comments. A previous draft
of this paper was presented at “Next Generation Legal Scholarship: A Work-in-Progress Symposium
of the Graduate Programs at Yale Law School.” As the assigned commentator on my paper, Prof.
Mariana Prado has helped substantially strengthen this paper’s argument. I also want to thank other
commentators at that symposium, including Neysun Mahboubi, Jeffrey Prescott, and Jamie Horsley.
Finally, but not least importantly, I want to thank Mr. Steve Burnham for his kindness in editing. All
perceived errors are mine.
1. See, e.g., CARL B. KLOCKARS ET AL., THE MEASUREMENT OF POLICE INTEGRITY (1997);
Dilip K. Das, Policing of Corruption: Exploring Practice through Research, in POLICING
CORRUPTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (Rick Sarre et al. eds., 2005).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT KLITGAARD ET AL., CORRUPT CITIES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CURE
AND PREVENTION (2000), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=Bju8SS6mMjgC&printsec
=frontcover&dq=corrupt+cities.
3. See generally Maurice Punch, Police Corruption and Its Prevention, 8 EUR. J. ON
CRIM. POL’Y & RES. 303 (2000); Tim Newburn, Understanding and Preventing Police
Corruption: Lessons from the Literature, 110 POLICE RESEARCH SERIES 17 (1999), available at
http://www.popcenter.org/problems/street_prostitution/PDFs/Newburn_1999.pdf.
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governments been more successful than democratic ones in combating
police corruption? Moreover, how have checks and balances in certain
regimes impacted their policies and ability to control police corruption?
To answer these questions, I make two major arguments in this
paper. First, in principle, an institutionalized organization independent of
the police force that assumes the responsibility of investigating,
monitoring, and preventing police corruption is necessary for the
effective control of police corruption in the long run. The police force
itself cannot reliably combat police corruption because of the popularity
of “the blue code of silence” within the force. Second, there is a dilemma
with checks and balances in the process of controlling police corruption.
On the one hand, the establishment of an institutionalized independent
organization assuming the task of anticorruption helps place checks and
balances on the police force. On the other hand, this pursuit of checks
and balances could ironically be better achieved in a regime without
institutionalized checks and balances than in one with them. These
arguments result from a comparative case study of police corruption
control in two cities, Hong Kong and New York City (“NYC”).
The paper is organized as follows: Section II states a general
proposition about the equilibrium of police corruption and some relevant
factors conducive to the transformation of the equilibrium. After that,
Section III presents the two cases of Hong Kong and NYC, describing
their relevant socioeconomic and political backgrounds, their different
approaches to combating police corruption, and the different outcomes.
Section IV sorts out certain commonalities and differences of these two
cases and presents several explanations for their different results of
police corruption control. Finally, this article concludes by drawing
policy implications for reform in the future.
II. THE EQUILIBRIUM OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND ITS
TRANSFORMATION
Corruption is the abuse of public power by officers for their own
private benefits. On a theoretical level, it is useful to conceptualize three
scenarios that indicate the possible extent of corruption in a certain
regime. The first scenario is that most officers are corrupt and, because
of the popularity of corruption in the regime, it is certainly more
beneficial for rational officers to take bribery than to be loyal to the law.
In contrast, the second scenario represents a situation in which most
officers are clean and, because of the popularity of loyalty to the law, it is
more costly for officers to be corrupt than to be loyal. Without
significant external changes, the above two situations are usually stable
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since one or a few individual officers will not change the costliness of
going against the status quo. In the third scenario, however, about half of
the officers are corrupt and about half are clean. In this case, the change
of one or a few officers from corrupt to clean, or the opposite movement,
might affect the whole equilibrium. Therefore, the third scenario is not
stable. In the literature of economics of corruption, as ideal models, the
previous three scenarios are defined as the equilibrium of corruption
(“EC”), the equilibrium of integrity (“EI”), and the equilibrium of a mix
of corruption and integrity (“EM”) respectively.4
The above framework of corruption equilibria is helpful in
understanding the nature of anticorruption reforms: usually, reform is a
process of changing the EC to the EI via the EM. Generally speaking,
this process of transformation is structurally constrained by institutions
and is time-consuming, which are results more of collective actions than
individual choices. As Melanie Manion argues, “[w]hile no single player
can unilaterally choose the other equilibrium with her actions, an
equilibrium shift is certainly conceivable if some way can be found to
coordinate the choices of many players to act differently.”5 In this sense,
the transformation from the EC to the EI requires certain structural
rearrangements through different strategies.
Previous researchers have found that no single strategy is a panacea
of anticorruption, either regarding corruption as a general governmental
problem6 or specifically dealing with police corruption.7 In general,
anticorruption strategies include the following measures: (1) policies to
reduce the opportunity for—and benefits of—corruption, (2) policies to
increase the likelihood of corruption being detected, and (3) policies to
make punishment of transgressors more likely.8
But the unique nature of police corruption, a hierarchically organized
form of crime within the police force widely tolerated by police officers,
also makes the task of curbing police corruption distinct from other types

4. See generally Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J.
ECON. LIT. 1320 (1997).
5. See MELANIE MANION, CORRUPTION BY DESIGN: BUILDING CLEAN GOVERNMENT IN
MAINLAND CHINA AND HONG KONG 12 (2004).
6. See, e.g., SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (1999); RICK STAPENHURST & SAHR J. KPUNDEH, CURBING
CORRUPTION: TOWARD A MODEL FOR BUILDING NATIONAL INTEGRITY (1999), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=eLh72ZUQcssC&printsec=frontcover&dq=CURBING+CORRU
PTION.
7. See, e.g., Das, supra note 1, at 9–15; SANJA KUTNJAK-IVKOVIC, FALLEN BLUE KNIGHTS:
CONTROLLING POLICE CORRUPTION (2005).
8. See STAPENHURST & KPUNDEH, supra note 6; MANION, supra note 5.
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of corruption control.9 For police corruption control, a fourth policy of
changing the attitude of police officers toward corruption through
organizational rebuilding and education has to be adopted.10
While the choice of strategy is a major determinant of police
corruption control, the choice itself is constrained at least by two other
factors: the political structure of the regime where reforms are enforced,
and resistance from the police at whom reforms are targeting.11
Obviously, any decision-maker is not independent of her political
context. There is no exception for decision-makers of anticorruption
policies. Reformers, who are undertaking the tough job of changing the
equilibrium of corruption, are constrained by both domestic and
international politics.12 Furthermore, as for police corruption control, the
targeted police force usually demonstrates tremendous resistance. As a
result, police corruption control is inevitably a political arena full of
multilateral interactions among different players. In other words, the
choice of strategy by reformers is also constrained by reactions from
other players, in particular the police. Usually these interactions are
dynamically developed when players are responding to a series of events,
including (1) a police corruption scandal, (2) investigation into the
scandal, (3) prosecution of the corrupted, (4) internal or external
organizational rebuilding, and (5) resistance from the police force.13
In sum, successful reforms against regime-wide corruption usually
follow the transformation of the EC to the EI via the EM. This process is
significantly affected by the reformers’ choice of strategy, which is
constrained by the political structure and interactions among players. The
9. See, e.g., ALASTAIR BLAIR-KERR, SECOND REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
UNDER SIR ALASTAIR BLAIR-KERR (HONG KONG, 1973); THE KNAPP COMMISSION, THE KNAPP
COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION (NEW YORK, 1972); THE MOLLEN COMMISSION,
COMMISSION REPORT/NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT (New York,
1994).
10. The four categories of anticorruption strategy are mostly performed by reformers
throughout the world. But they are not the only choices. In her recent research on police corruption
control, Sanja Kutnjak-Ivkovic enumerates twelve tasks to be implemented: (1) to detect and
investigate corruption, (2) to discipline/punish corruption police, (3) to monitor propensity for
corruption, (4) to cultivate culture intolerant of corruption, (5) to establish supervision and
accountability, (6) to set official policies and enforce them, (7) to provide resources for control, (8)
to control the police agency’s efforts to control corruption, (9) to detect and investigate corruption
not investigated by the police agency, (10) to improve the existing system, (11) to limit opportunities
for corruption, and (12) to disseminate true information about corruption. See KUTNJAK-IVKOVIC,
supra note 7, at 100.
11. See Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Corruption Control: Environmental Context versus
Organizational Policy, in POLICE AND SOCIETY 107 (David H. Bayley ed., 1977).
12. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 6.
13. See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, SCANDAL AND REFORM: CONTROLLING POLICE
CORRUPTION (1978); HENRY J. LETHBRIDGE, HARD GRAFT IN HONG KONG: SCANDAL,
CORRUPTION, THE ICAC (1985).
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uniqueness of police corruption, meanwhile, imposes more challenges on
reformers and requires additional anticorruption strategies, such as
organizational rebuilding of the police force and overall education on
police officers.
The following stories of Hong Kong and NYC will illustrate the
above theoretical understandings of anticorruption reforms in general and
the control of police corruption in particular.
III. POLICE CORRUPTION CONTROL IN HONG KONG AND NYC
With regard to police corruption control, Hong Kong and NYC are
two ideal cases to be compared. Hong Kong represents a successful case
of changing the equilibrium of police corruption. On the other hand, the
New York Police Department (“NYPD”) has periodically suffered from
widespread corruption in the past century. In this section, this paper will
first introduce the backgrounds of the two cases and illustrate the
comparability between them. This paper will then describe the
development of the two stories diachronically, focusing on the decades
around the 1970s when major reforms happened both in Hong Kong and
NYC.
A. A Review of Backgrounds
Police corruption results from constant and variable factors14 and,
therefore, takes many forms in different nations.15 Accordingly,
successful control of police corruption requires systematic reforms. 16
Because of the various forms of police corruption, it is impossible to
present all of the possible relevant background information in one
research article; not every potential explanatory variable can be
controlled and analyzed. Nevertheless, the more variables accounted for,
the more valid the research is going to be. In this sense, it is helpful to
introduce some similarities between Hong Kong and NYC in terms of
their social, economic, and politic backgrounds relevant to police
corruption control.

14. See Newburn, supra note 3.
15. Maurice Punch sorts out nine types of police corruption, including (1) corruption of
authority, (2) ‘kickbacks’, (3) opportunistic theft, (4) ‘shakedowns’, (5) protection of illegal
activities, (6) ‘the fix’, (7) direct criminal activities, (8) internal payoffs, and (9) ‘flaking’ or
‘padding’. See Punch, supra note 3, at 303.
16. See Newburn, supra note 3, at 28-44.
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1. Similarities in socioeconomic backgrounds
The two cities are quite close to each other in many aspects. First,
both Hong Kong and NYC are currently among the wealthiest cities in
the world.17 Historically, while NYC has been the financial heart of the
industrialized United States for more than one century, Hong Kong
quickly became one of the most industrialized areas of the world after the
Second World War and has been enjoying its worldwide reputation as
one of Asia’s “four little dragons.”18 Second, although there is a legacy
of Chinese culture mixed in the Hong Kong’s legal system, it shares a
British legal tradition with its counterpart in NYC. In addition, even
more interestingly, the municipal police forces in both cities were
established during the same period, that is, the mid-1840s.19 Finally, the
sizes of the two cities are quite close in terms of population.20 Given the
total number of police officers allocated within Hong Kong and NYC,
both cities are among the most police-dense cities in the world.21
2. Comparison of political structures
In addition to their socioeconomic backgrounds, the two cities share
certain elements relating to political structure. First, although neither
Hong Kong nor NYC is a sovereign state, both are constitutionally
empowered with a full police power within their jurisdiction. In this
sense, police corruption control is basically a municipal affair in both
cities. A clear division of labor among different governmental branches

17. According to The Global Financial Centres Index 5, which is published by the City of
London in March 2009, New York City and Hong Kong currently rank at the second and the forth
among all global financial centers, respectively. The index is available at http://217.154.230.218/NR/
rdonlyres/8D37DAE2-5937-4FC5-A004C2FC4BED7742/ 0/BC_RS_GFCI5.pdf.
18. See EZRA F. VOGEL, THE FOUR LITTLE DRAGONS: THE SPREAD OF INDUSTRIALIZATION
IN EAST ASIA (1991).
19. For the historical origin of the Hong Kong police force, see Mark S. Gaylord & Harold
Traver, Colonial Policing and the Demise of British Rule in Hong Kong, 1995 INT’L J. SOC. L. 23;
for the official creation of the NYPD, see Craig D. Uchida, The Development of the American
Police: An Historical Overview, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 18
(Roger G. Dunham, & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., 2001).
20. According to the Hong Kong census, Hong Kong had a population of 3,950,000 in 1971
and of 6,840,000 in 1999. Demographia.com, Hong Kong Population History,
http://www.demographia.com/db-hkhist.htm. According to the U.S. census, meanwhile, New York
City had a population of 7,896,000 in 1970 and 8,008,000 in 2000. Demographia.com, City on a
Hill: New York City Reaches Population Peak, http://www.demographia.com/db-nyc2000.htm.
21. Currently, the Hong Kong Police Force employs about 33,000 officers. See Hong Kong
Police Force – Organization Structure, http://www.police.gov.hk/hkp-home/english/org/index.htm
(last visited on March 25, 2009). The New York Police Department, meanwhile, employs about
38,000 officers. See NYPD – Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/faq/
faq_police.shtml#1 (last visited on March 25, 2009).
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has been formalized for decades in both cities. Accordingly, the three
branches of the city hall, the city council, and the city court have been
established for a long period of time. In both cities, city hall has been
empowered to appoint most public officials directly or indirectly,
including the police commissioner. Furthermore, the judicial systems in
both cities have been considerably independent of the other institutions,
and the citizens have enjoyed freedom of speech.22
However, one difference between the two cases makes them
significantly distinct from each other. Generally speaking, when reforms
were conducted, an institutionalized mechanism of checks and balances,
in particular on the executive branch, existed in NYC but not in Hong
Kong. In NYC, this mechanism was established by the city charter and
guaranteed by a complicated system of elections. In NYC, elected
municipal officials include the mayor, the comptroller (the city’s chief
financial officer), city council members, some judges of the municipal
judicial system, district attorneys, several members of the board of
education, etc.23 Although municipal elections have been dominated by
the Democratic Party over decades, many unpopular politicians were
kicked out of their positions by voters either through inter-party or intraparty competitions, which makes the mechanism of checks and balances
work in municipal politics.
In contrast, neither the governor nor any other officials were elected
by the Hong Kong people during the 1970s.24 The colonial government
followed an executive-dominant system. In this regime, there was a
formalized separation of power between the governor, the Legislative
Council, and the judiciary. But, in fact, the governor had actual
autocratic power through dominating the decision-making process of
appointment. Before the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, the colonial
governor had the following powers: (1) he appointed all members of the
Executive Council and the Legislative Council before 1985; (2) he was
chairman of both the Executive Council and the Legislative Council until
1991 and could dissolve the Legislative Council at any time; (3) all
appointments, promotions, and transfers of public officials in the colony

22. While the people of Hong Kong in the 1970s enjoyed less freedom than their counterparts
in NYC because of the nature of colonial government in Hong Kong, the society was free in
principle. In particular, the British-dominating court was protected by a tradition of rule of law
transplanted from England. English publishers in Hong Kong society, such as The Hong Kong Law
Journal and The Far East Economic Review, enjoyed substantial freedom.
23. See generally CHARLES BRECHER ET AL., POWER FAILURE: NEW YORK CITY POLITICS
AND POLICY SINCE 1960 (1993).
24. Democratization in Hong Kong started in the 1980s after the Sino-British negotiations
during 1982–84, one decade after the establishment of the ICAC. See IAN SCOTT, POLITICAL
CHANGE AND THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY IN HONG KONG 1-8 (1989).
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were made in his name; and (4) he could disregard the opinion of the
majority of Executive Council and only had to explain the reason to the
British Foreign Office.25 This power structure brought many
conveniences that allowed the governor to implement his own policy.
3. Different results in combating police corruption
Another crucial difference between the two cities is the different
results that occurred in trying to control police corruption. Hong Kong
has been widely appreciated as a successful case since the building of the
Independent Commission Against Corruption (“ICAC”) in 1974.26
Nevertheless, for the past hundred years, NYC has been suffering from
twenty-year cycles of corruption, scandal, reform backslide, and fresh
scandal in its police department.27 From 1894 to 1994, there were six
major investigations performed by different special commissions.28 The
first five faced the same fate—however successful their reforms might
have been in the short run, none of them succeeded in achieving police
integrity on a lasting basis.29
B. Hong Kong: Changing the Equilibrium of Police Corruption
The Hong Kong story begins with a short prelude before the 1970s
and ends with the establishment of a new equilibrium of integrity in the
Hong Kong police department decades after.30 The establishment of the
new equilibrium started with widespread acceptance within the police
force of corruption and the Hong Kong people’s resentment against that.
Hong Kong then went through reforms to clean the police force step by
step, and ended with the consolidation of institutional rebuilding to
guarantee a government of integrity. Like the old saying that “Rome was
not built in one day,” the success of Hong Kong’s anticorruption reforms

25. See Ma Ngok, Lecture 2: The Chief Executive and the Executive Branch, in HONG KONG
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS (Spring 2006) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
26. See LETHBRIDGE, supra note 13; KLITGAARD ET AL., supra note 2.
27. See Harold Baer, Jr., & Joseph P. Armao, The Mollen Commission Report: An Overview,
40 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 73 (1995).
28. The six investigations were implemented by the Lexow Committee (1894), the Curran
Committee (1913), the Seabury Committee (1930), the Harry Gross Committee (1950), the Knapp
Commission (1971), and the Mollen Commission (1994) respectively. For more details, see Gabriel
J. Chin, Series Introduction, in NEW YORK CITY POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMISSION,
1894–1994 (Gabriel J. Chin ed., 1997).
29. See SHERMAN, supra note 133; THE MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 9; Chin, supra
note 28.
30. For a general review of Hong Kong’s anticorruption efforts, see BERTRAND DE SPEVILLE,
HONG KONG: POLICY INITIATIVES AGAINST CORRUPTION (1997).
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did not come until the reformers had overcome enormous challenges, in
particular those from within the police force.
1. Prelude
In the Hong Kong colonial regime, during the period before the
systematic reforms in the middle 1970s, corruption was widespread and a
serious governmental problem. Responding to the social disease, the
government adopted a set of institutional reforms.31 In the legislative
branch, as early as 1898, the colonial government promulgated its first
legislation dealing specially with bribery and corruption, the
Misdemeanors Punishment Ordinance. Fifty years later, the Prevention
of Corruption Ordinance (1948) was passed as a response to the
prevailing concern to the public service needed to be cleaned up.
However, these regulations were “little more than a literal adoption of
corresponding legislations in England.”32 They had little effect on
corruption control. Only decades later, with real changes of policy and
attempts adapted to local conditions, the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance was promulgated in 1971, which was the principal statute
relied on during the reforming era.33
31. For the historical development of anticorruption efforts in Hong Kong, see Bernard
Downey, Combating Corruption: The Hong Kong Solution, 6 HONG KONG L. J. 27 (1976); Kuan
Hsin-Chi, Anti-corruption Legislation in Hong Kong: A History, in CORRUPTION AND ITS CONTROL
IN HONG KONG: SITUATION UP TO THE LATE SEVENTIES (Rance P. L. Lee ed., 1981); LETHBRIDGE,
supra note 13.
32. See Downey, supra note 31, at 29.
33. In particular, Section 10 of the 1971 ordinance not only made it possible to prosecute a
public servant who lived with an unexpectedly high standard of living, but was also the center of the
debates in the 1974 reform. The section provided:
(1) Any person who, being or having been a Crown servant—
(a) maintains a standard of living about that which is commensurate with his present
or past official emoluments, or
(b) is in control of pecuniary resources property disproportionate to his present or past
official emoluments,
shall, unless he gives a satisfactory explanation to the court as to how he was able to
maintain such a standard of living or how much pecuniary recourses or property came
under his control, be guilty of an offense.
(2) No prosecution for an offense under subsection (1) should be instituted without the
consent in the writing of the Attorney General, who shall, before consenting to the
institution of a prosecution against a person for such an offense, inform that person a
prosecution against him for such an offense is under consideration and give him an
opportunity of making representations in writing to the Attorney General.
(3) Neither section 7 of the Legal Officers Ordinance nor section 43 of the Interpretation
and General Clauses Ordinance shall apply for or in respect of this section.
(4) Any representation in writing by a person to the Attorney General under subsection
(2) shall not, with the consent of that person, be admissible in evidence in any
proceedings against him for any offense.
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In the executive branch, these laws involved institutional
adjustments. For instance, as a response to the 1948 ordinance, the AntiCorruption Branch (“ACB”) was established within the police
department. The ACB was a specialized police unit with the
responsibility to investigate and prosecute corruption cases. A standing
committee on corruption was set up in 1956, which reported directly to
the governor and was composed of the attorney general, senior police
officers, and several unofficial members of the Executive Council.
It was the standing committee that gave an early proposal in the late
1950s to establish an external institution to investigate police corruption
when it found that the ACB did not work well. But the proposal failed
because of resistance from the police department. As a compromising
and alternative approach in place of the proposal, the ACB was promoted
to the Anti-Corruption Office (“ACO”) with the Assistant Commissioner
of Police as its director. The standing committee had also significantly
contributed to the 1971 ordinance.
Regardless of these efforts, the corruption problem was not well
handled. Sir Alastair Blair-Kerr reported that there was a saying popular
in the police force before the middle-1970s reforms: (1) “Get on the bus”
(if you wish to accept corruption, join us); or (2) “run alongside the bus”
(if you do not wish to accept corruption, it does not matter, but do not
interfere); but (3) “never stand in front of the bus” (if you try to report
corruption, the “bus” will knock you down—you will be injured or even
killed or your business will be ruined).34
The effect of widespread corruption within the government was
terrible. It contributed to a serious governmental crisis in the late 1960s,
which eventually led to the appointment of a new governor, Sir Murray
MacLehose, in November 1971.35 Sir MacLehose was a man of great
integrity and a true statesman. In his administration, the Legislative
Council followed the suggestion from the standing committee on
corruption and passed the 1971 ordinance. After that, there was a slight
increase of prosecution against corrupted officers. However, a systematic
campaign against police corruption did not happen until a big scandal in
1973.

(5) In this section “official emoluments” includes a pension or gratuity payable under the
Pensions Ordinance.
34. See BLAIR-KERR, supra note 9, at 26.
35. See SCOTT, supra note 244.
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2. The Godber incident
In late April 1973, a routine query from a Canadian bank about the
lack of activity in one senior police officer’s account came to the
attention of the police commissioner, Charles Sutcliffe, mainly because
the officer had misrepresented his official position to the bank.36 This
officer was Peter Godber and was then a reputed policeman and Deputy
District Police Commissioner of Kowloon District. He was born in
London in 1922 and joined the Hong Kong police force in 1952 as a
probationary sub-inspector (a designation that is no longer in use). He
had been promoted several times and to his current position in 1971.
The query from the Canadian bank quickly led to the disclosure of
Godber’s unexpected wealth, which caused the Commissioner to initiate
an investigation by the ACO. By the end of May, the team from the ACO
had discovered that Godber’s financial resources totaled over HK$4.3
million (about US$780,000), which was nearly six times his total net
salary during his twenty-year service in Hong Kong.37
The disclosure prompted the ACO’s decision to prosecute Peter
Godber. But according to section 10 of the 1971 ordinance, a reasonable
period should be provided for the suspect to present an explanation in
writing after the attorney general notified him of the coming prosecution.
Godber was offered one week to prepare his explanation. During this
period, although immigration officers at the airport were instructed to
stop and detain him if he attempted to leave Hong Kong, Godber was not
put under surveillance. Godber left Hong Kong by air on June 8, 1973.
The escape of Godber put the Hong Kong colonial government in a
very embarrassing position. According to British law, a fugitive offender
who went to England could be sent back to Hong Kong only if he could
be condemned in both jurisdictions. Unfortunately, the case of Peter
Godber did not satisfy this requirement of double criminality.38 In other
words, Godber could stay in England, legally enjoying his illegal money
from Hong Kong.
The story of corruption and escape of punishment was quickly and
widely diffused in Hong Kong by the mass media. Godber became
notorious as a symbol of police corruption and government impotence in
Hong Kong. Students raised an outcry against corruption with slogans
like “fight Corruption, arrest Godber.” Protesters strongly petitioned the
British prime minister to extradite Godber back to Hong Kong. Bernard
Downey, a faculty of Hong Kong University Law School and then judge
36. See MANION, supra note 5, at 32.
37. See LETHBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 95; MANION, supra note 5, at 32–33.
38. See Bernard Downey, Editorial: Godber, 3 HONG KONG L. J. 249 (1973).

196

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 23

of the District Court of Hong Kong, remarked in his editorial for the
Hong Kong Law Journal:
The ordinary man in the Hong Kong street quite fairly thinks it
monstrous that a senior British official should be able to commit a
serious criminal offence in the Colony and then be permitted to enjoy
his ill-gotten wealth in Britain, safe under the protection of British law.
It is commonly felt that Britain exploits Hong Kong economically and
that Hong Kong’s position as the largest holder of sterling reserves is
positive proof of this . . . However, despite the apparent conviction of a
large proportion of Hong Kong’s community that, if he wants to, the
Governor has only to pick up the phone to Whitehall in order to secure
39
Peter Godber’s return . . . .

3. The Blair-Kerr investigation
The public pressure forced the colonial government to make a quick
response to prevent a riot. Under the new governor, one of the
government’s quick responses was an independent investigation into
police corruption soon after the departure of Godber. The investigation
was run by Sir Alastair Blair-Kerr, a Senior Puisne Judge. Under the
Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance, Sir Alastair was responsible for the
following duties: (1) within three weeks, to report the circumstances in
which Peter Godber was able to leave Hong Kong; and (2) within three
months, to report on the effectiveness of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance and suggest amendments and other changes in current
amendments considered necessary.40
Very efficiently, Sir Alastair submitted his two reports on July 13,
1973 and September 1, 1973, respectively. In his first report, Sir Alastair
conceded that more should have been done to prevent Godber from
escaping and recommended that the 1971 ordinance be amended to make
prosecution against corruption likely. As a result of this report, the
Legislative Council amended the 1971 ordinance in August of 1973. In
his second report in September, Sir Alastair concluded that corruption
was rife in Hong Kong. In particular, “police corruption typically took
the form of ‘syndicated corruption,’ in which a number of officers join
together to extort money for abstaining from mandatory duties.
Syndicated police corruption was localized, situated within Hong Kong’s
16 territorial divisions or sub-divisions.”41 For Sir Alastair, the problem
39. Id. at 249.
40. See Downey, supra note 31, at 36.
41. MANION, supra note 5, at 30. The evaluation of police corruption by Sir Alastair was
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of the widespread and organized police corruption resulted not only from
problematic ordinances but also the lack of enforcement of these
ordinances.42
Certainly, both the law and its enforcement needed to be improved.
As Bernard Downey remarks,
Sir Alastair Blair-Kerr’s second report, the obvious difficulties
surrounding the interpretation of [section 10 of the 1971 ordinance],
and mounting public criticism of the manner in which the law was, or
was not, being enforced, clearly pointed to the need for a thorough and
careful review of the law and the machinery of enforcement.” 43

Since the police department had been responsible for investigating
corruption cases and implementing the law, some adjustments to the
department seemed to be necessary. These adjustments could follow one
of two approaches: either establish an independent anticorruption
organization as a substitute for the Anti-Corruption Office, or conduct
reforms by keeping the major responsibility of anticorruption within the
police force. For certain reasons, Sir Alastair did not make his answer to
the question very clear.44
4. The establishment of the ICAC and its achievements
As for the existing institutional anticorruption framework, Sir
Alastair vehemently criticized the dysfunction of the ACO on the one
hand, but on the other hand, he seemed to have some concerns about the
establishment of a new institution. Sir Alistair’s second report cited
arguments made by the police commissioner that demonstrated the
concerns over creating a new anticorruption institution. Commissioner
Sutcliffe, a policeman of great integrity and a true reformer, strongly
defended a policy in favor of status quo, that is, keeping the power of
widely accepted. Years later, Gerald Harknett, Director of Operations of the ICAC, defined a
corruption syndicate as:
a body of officers with a common interest in agreeing not to take action or take certain
action which will produce a corruption income. This generally involves covering up some
form of illegal activity, whether it be trafficking in dangerous drugs, illegal gambling,
prostitution and other vice, or breaches of procedures connected with immigration,
housing construction projects, fire prevention, licensing, etc.
LETHBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 117.
42. See BLAIR-KERR, supra note 9, at 21–22.
43. See Downey, supra note 31, at 51.
44. See LETHBRIDGE, supra note 13.
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investigating corruption within the police department. Commissioner
Sutcliffe argued that it was the police officers, not others, who were
responsible for investigating crime, and that corruption was a crime. He
also strongly believed that police officers were the most professional and
efficient at investigating crime. He further assumed that if there was
some independent organization established, the morale of the police
force would be at stake.45 From the perspective of the police force as an
interest group, the Commissioner’s position is understandable and
expected. While Commissioner Sutcliffe tried to keep the power within
the police force, he by no means rejected proposals to improve the
organization. He did introduce a number of organizational reforms,
reshuffling the hierarchy of the force and redistributing powers in order
to dilute the monopoly of powers by sergeants.
Sir Murray MacLehose, however, stood on the opposite position of
Commissioner Sutcliffe. On October 17, 1973, Governor MacLehose

45. Sir Alastair copied Commissioner Sutcliffe’s trenchant views against establishing ICAC
in his second report. These views of Commissioner Sutcliffe were:
1. Corruption is a crime and the investigation of crime is the task of officers trained in
investigation work with court proceedings in mind. The investigation of crime is not
within the province of lawyers and others.
2. There is no source of trained investigations in Hong Kong outside the Royal Hong
Kong Police Force.
3. It is unlikely that police officers of ability would wish to transfer to an Anti-Corruption
Bureau independent of the police because such a bureau would offer very limited career
prospects. It is likely that any officers who would be willing to transfer from the police
force would be officers of limited ability with little prospects of promotion in the force.
4. Apart from impairing their career prospects, officers of ability would find it distasteful
to spend their working lives in an Anti-Corruption Bureau, independent or otherwise.
5. The Recruitment of police officers from overseas would prove difficult and, in any
case, would take time.
6. An independent Anti-Corruption Bureau would lose the vast knowledge and resources
which the Hong Kong police can bring to bear against crime, including corruption, and
the advice and counsel of the Commissioner, his Deputies, and the Director of Criminal
Investigation.
7. There is no guarantee that corrupt elements would not soon infiltrate into an
independent bureau. If that were to happen, it would be impossible for a small bureau to
turn inwards upon itself in order to investigate itself, whereas it is a relatively simple
matter for a vast organization like the Royal Hong Kong Police Force to investigate any
part of itself. Corruption in an independent bureau would have to be investigated by the
Royal Hong Kong Police Force.
8. A bureau staffed by police investigations but responsible to persons other than the
Commissioner of Police and his officers would be nothing more than an emphatic vote of
no confidence in the senior officers of the police force and would be strongly resented by
the officers of the police force. The morale of the force is at stake. The result of any
lowering of the morale of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force would be putting in
jeopardy the peace, order and security of Hong Kong.
See BLAIR-KERR, supra note 9, at 84.
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made his argument for an independent anticorruption organization before
the Legislative Council. He emphasized two points in support of this
innovation:
I think the situation calls for an organization, led by men of high rank
and status, which can devote its whole time to the eradication of this
evil. . . . A further and conclusive argument is that public confidence is
very much involved. Clearly the public would have more confidence in
a unit that was entirely independent, and separate from any department
46
of the Government, including the Police.

Not only the governor but also the people of Hong Kong demanded a
new and effective institution to curb the widespread corruption. The
prevailing perception was that the long-rotten police force was simply
not reliable. An ordinance that enabled the Independent Commission
Against Corruption (“ICAC”) was passed in February 1974. “[T]he
ICAC reflect[ed] and crystallize[d] the ‘felt needs’ of its time.”47
According to the ordinance, the ICAC aims to (1) pursue the corrupt
through effective detection, investigation, and prosecution; (2) eliminate
opportunities for corruption by introducing corruption-resistant practices;
and (3) educate the public on the evils of corruption and foster their
support in fighting corruption.48 Correspondingly, there are three major
departments in the ICAC: operations, corruption prevention, and
community relations. The new institution was politically, financially, and
organizationally independent of any other agency, including the Royal
Police Force, except that the commissioner was made responsible to the
governor directly. Jack Cater was appointed to be the first ICAC
Commissioner. Cater was widely known as a man of integrity and a civil
servant of great ability during his 30-year civil service in Hong Kong.
Now he was leading a brand new anticorruption institution with a staff of
682, including 225 police officers and civilian employees of the former
Anti-Corruption Office, with the full support of the governor.49 Both the
innovative framework design and the choice of a charismatic leader were
helpful for the good image of the ICAC at the very outset.50

46. Hong Kong ICAC, History, http://www.icac.org.hk/new_icac/eng/abou/history/
main_6.html.
47. Ambrose Yeo-Chi King, An Institutional Response to Corruption: The ICAC of Hong
Kong, in HONG KONG DILEMMAS OF GROWTH 115 (Leung Chi-Keung et al. eds., 1980).
48. Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance § 12, No. 204, (2009), available
at http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/en/ord/204/s12.html.
49. See LETHBRIDGE, supra note 13.
50. See King, supra note 47.
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At the beginning stage, it was not surprising for the ICAC to focus
on the first function to pursue the corrupt through effective detection,
investigation, and prosecution. Not surprisingly, “[t]he ICAC’s first
important task was to bring Godber to justice.”51 In early 1975, Godber
was extradited from England to stand trial. Mr. Godber was eventually
found guilty and sentenced to four-year imprisonment in February 1975.
Godber’s extradition and prosecution demonstrated the ICAC’s
determination and resolution to eradicate corruption. It was this landmark
case that kicked off a quiet revolution—a new start against corruption.
This “new start” resulted in a total of 108 prosecutions and 66
convictions in the ICAC’s first year.52
Although the ICAC had succeeded in prosecuting several notorious
corrupt individuals and cleaning the business circle in its first two years,
the campaign against syndicated corruption in the police force was not
launched until 1976, in part because the new investigatory institution had
to rely on human resources from the police department at first. As early
as 1975, though, the working schedule on this issue was foreshadowed
by the commissioner. In his annual review, Commissioner Cater
announced,
1975 was a year of consolidation—of consolidation and of preparation
for the titanic struggle which lies ahead. For our aim is to break the
back of organized, syndicated corruption within the next year or two.
1976 and 1977 are going to be crucial and testing years both for the
53
Commission and for the community of Hong Kong.

The working agenda performed very well. In 1976, the ICAC was
convinced that almost every police division had built its own corruption
syndicate for decades, some of which could even be traced back to the
nineteenth century. The large-scale and longstanding police corruption
was not eradicated until the late 1970s. During the campaign, large
numbers of police officers were investigated, prosecuted, and convicted.
According to the ICAC Annual Report, by the end of 1977, a total of
7312 corruption reports were received, 3519 cases were investigated, and
749 persons were prosecuted. Most of the convicted were police officers,
including a large number of sergeants. In some cases, dozens of officers
were convicted and imprisoned in a single corruption case. In July 1977,
Commissioner Cater reported to the governor that no major corruption
51. Hong Kong ICAC, History, http://www.icac.org.hk/new_icac/eng/abou/history/
main_7.html.
52. See King, supra note 477, at 119.
53. LETHBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 116.
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syndicates were known to exist and those remaining were either dormant
or had been shattered into small, and therefore financially less rewarding,
groups.54
The success of the ICAC in fighting for a better and cleaner Hong
Kong was also demonstrated by its ability and resolution in slaying “big
tigers.”55 In addition to the Godber case, the cases of Au Yeung, Tsang
Kai-wing, Norman Temple, Paul Lee and Roy Sturgeon, Cunningham
and Thompson, the Kowloon Traffic Conspiracy, the Wanchai
Conspiracy and the High Island Water Scheme were all exposed, one by
one.56 All these achievements caused “a sudden, large shift in mass
public beliefs about anticorruption enforcement . . . .”57
5. Police officers’ opposition and the partial amnesty
The tremendous success of the ICAC in curbing police corruption
revived the confidence of the Hong Kong people in the government.
However, the morale of the police force was dampened immeasurably, in
particular by frequent and unwelcome queries and investigations.58 Many
officers resigned or were dismissed.59 The campaign also caused a wave
54. 1977 ICAC ANN. REP.
55. MANION, supra note 5, at 40.
56. See King, supra note 477.
57. See MANION, supra note 5, at 35.
58. According to one report by The South China Morning on July 11, 1976, “This is possibly
one of the most depressing periods of its existence because of the uncertainty that many officers feel
about their future and their concern about the inroads that corruption inquiries are making into the
fabric of the force.” See Dianne Wood, Low Morale-Officers Speak Out, S. CH. M. POST, July 11,
1976.
59. The following table enumerates the numbers of police resignations and dismissals during
1970 and 1982 in Hong Kong.

Year
1970-1
1971-2
1972-3
1973-4
1974-5
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

Commissioned Officers a

Non-commissioned Officers b

Resignations

Dismissals

Resignations

Dismissals

34
34
18
28
34
54
53
38
26
25
27
21

0
1
0
3
6
9
8
5
2
2
4
3

475
698
461
455
170
285
350
350
450
406
475
398

34
75
81
93
61
65
61
60
58
88
91
63
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of migration out of Hong Kong, especially among retired staff sergeants,
serving station and barracks sergeants, and other ranks.60
While the campaign went on, the confrontation between the ICAC
and the police force escalated. Several factors contributed to this
escalating confrontation. The first one was a belief, widely held by police
officers, that the ICAC seemed to be deliberately concentrating its
attention almost entirely on the police force and that the Commission
appeared to be carrying out a vendetta against the police force.61 A
second reason was related to the officers’ natural hostility to the rivalrous
force of the ICAC, which had significantly deprived the police force of
its powers. Thirdly, financial recourses were lessened and life became
much less secure, particularly for those officers, mostly Chinese, who
had significantly relied on dirty money to support their families. This
situation was exacerbated because the anticorruption campaign coexisted
with a sharp economic recession in Hong Kong during those years.62
A police mutiny eventually emerged in October 1977. More than one
hundred police officers from three Kowloon divisions were arrested for
alleged involvement in syndicated corruption. On October 28, a large
number of officers marched to police headquarters with a petition against
the ICAC. Soon after, some forty officers went to the Operations
Department of the ICAC and took part in a violent demonstration against
the department. During the following week, the situation seemed to be
out of control, which led to a crisis of law and order in Hong Kong.
Quickly responding to the crisis, the Governor made a very critical
statement on November 5, 1977 on television, which was widely known
as “the partial amnesty.” According to this announcement,
[T]he ICAC in the future would ‘not normally act’ on complaints or
evidence relating to offences committed before January 1977 except in
relation to persons who had already been interviewed, persons against
whom warrants had been issued, and persons outside of Hong Kong on
63
November 5, and cases so heinous it would be unthinkable not to act.

LETHBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 225 (citing ANN. REP. OF THE COMM’R OF POLICE).
Note a & b: The Hong Kong police in the colonial era, as a body, contained two main
segments or layers. On the one hand, there were the inspectorate and senior officers (superintendents
and above), mostly British in the mid-1970s. On the other hand, the majority of the rank and file
police officers were Chinese. The commissioned officers were referred to as the first layer; the noncommissioned officers, as the later layer. LETHBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 118.
60. See id.
61. See King, supra note 47.
62. See LETHBRIDGE, supra note 1313.
63. King, supra note 47, at 130.
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The partial amnesty succeeded in appeasing the majority of the uneasy
police officers and brought them back to the daily job of implementing
the law.
6. Institutionalization of the ICAC and consolidation of the equilibrium
of integrity
The partial amnesty imposed a dual impact on the ICAC. It was first
of all negative. The public’s confidence in the ICAC’s determination to
combat corruption was shaken. But, from a practical perspective, the
amnesty did contribute to operational efficiency of the ICAC by relieving
its investigators from many lengthy, costly, and difficult investigations
into past offenses. It also “produced a second desirable practical result:
Without the fear of investigation and prosecution for past activities, an
increasing number of officials showed a new willingness to assist ICAC
investigators.”64
Another less-discussed significance of the amnesty is that the
uneasiness of the police force demonstrated the possibility of a new
Leviathanal power within the politics of Hong Kong. The methods of
investigation adopted by the ICAC were widely criticized by police
officers involved, which made an external check on the ICAC necessary.
Therefore, soon after the statement of amnesty, the Governor set up an
ICAC Complaints Committee to monitor the operation of the ICAC,
which was composed of a group of eminent civil leaders.
After the major corruption syndicates had been abolished and the
police force was appeased by the amnesty, the campaign against police
corruption itself was normalized. Finished with the first part of this
operation, the ICAC could now spend more energy on its second and
third functions, to eliminate the many opportunities for corruption, and to
educate the public. As a matter of fact, the success of the Hong Kong
case in curbing police corruption was tightly related to the three-pronged
strategy of the ICAC.65
In summary, the achievements of the ICAC in curbing corruption
have significantly contributed to a clean Hong Kong66 with a new
64. MANION, supra note 5, at 41 (quoting 1979 ICAC ANN. REP.).
65. See id.
66. The transparency rankings from the Transparency International Report well illustrate the
cleanness of Hong Kong Government.
Year
Rank
Score

1998
16
7.8

1999
15
7.7

2000
15
7.7

2001
14
7.9

2002
14
8.2

2003
14
8.0

2004
16
8.0

2005
15
8.3

2006
15
8.3

2007
14
8.3

2008
12
8.1
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equilibrium of police integrity. Table 1 shows relevant data that illustrate
these achievements. Decades after the reforms in the mid-1970s, fewer
and fewer people now believe that corruption in the Hong Kong
government is very common. The majority of Hong Kong people do not
doubt that the performance of the ICAC has been effective. In particular,
the percentage of police corruption cases among all cases reported to the
ICAC has decreased from forty-five in 1974 to thirteen in 2002.
Table 1 Survey Data on Corruption in Hong Kong (1974-2002)67
Year

1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002

Mass Belief of
Widespread
Corruption

35%
16%
8%
6%
7%
2%
5%
3%
8%
7%
4%
3%
1%

Mass Belief of
Effective
Performance
of ICAC

72%
76%
84%
87%
88%
76%
75%
71%
69%
67%
70%
70%

Reports to ICAC
Alleging Police
Corruption
45%
46%
39%
30%
29%
30%
25%
20%
20%
20%
20%
19%
16%
14%
13%

C. NYC: Cycling Equilibria of Police Corruption
The NYC case shows a different story compared with Hong Kong. It
has suffered from twenty-year cycles of police scandal and reform. For
the convenience of comparison, this article focuses on the cycle that
started with the saga of Frank Serpico in the late 1960s and ended with
the Mollen Commission investigation in 1994 (the “Knapp-Mollen
See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX (CPI) 1998-1999, 20012005, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (follow hyperlinks for
individual years).
67. Adapted from MANION, supra note 5, at 58 tbl.2.2, 67 tbl.2.6, 68 tbl.2.7.
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cycle”). Specifically, this article describes the reforms around the Knapp
Commission investigation primarily provoked by the revelation of Frank
Serpico.68 The organization of the NYC story mirrors that of the Hong
Kong story, starting from pre-reform backgrounds and ending decades
later.
1. The Pre-Knapp era
In NYC, historically, there were two major organizations that were
supposed to monitor, investigate, and prevent police corruption before
the Knapp Commission.69 The first one was the Department of
Investigation of NYC. According to the City Charter, the Commissioner
of Investigation “is authorized and empowered to make any study or
investigation which in his opinion may be in the best interests of the
City, including but not limited to investigation of the affairs, functions,
actions, methods, personnel or efficiency of any agency.” Unfortunately,
however, the Department of Investigation “never seriously concerned
itself with police corruption,” and the fear of interfering with the Police
Department has been a definite restraint upon the Department of
Investigation.70
A second, more important anticorruption organization was the police
force itself. Before the Knapp-Mollen cycle, there were several units
within the NYPD responsible for anticorruption affairs. But, the
institution suffered heavily from organizational fragmentation. As
reported by the International Association of Police Chiefs, “[T]he various
units charged with searching out misconduct within the Department and
with maintaining internal discipline, efficiency and integrity were widely
dispersed, poorly coordinated, undermanned, and, in many instances, so

68. There are two major reasons for me to narrow my analysis of the NYC case to this
period. One reason is that, compared to previous ones, the 20-year cycle during the 1970s and 1990s
is the most recent police scandal in the history of the NYPD, and this coincidentally happened
during the same era as the Hong Kong case. Secondly, as opposed to the reforms suggested by the
Mollen Commission in 1994, the reforms suggested by the Knapp Commission were implemented
and completed, which makes it easier to do causal analysis.
69. For a general historical review of NYC’s efforts in fighting against police corruption, see
Chin, supra note 28.
70. The Knapp Commission found that there were three main factors contributing to the
dysfunction of the Department of Investigation. First, like the anticorruption unit within the police
force, the Department was short of manpower. The other two reasons are related to two
organizational characteristics of the Department. The first is that its investigative staff was composed
“of policemen and a few civilians who [were] work[ing] with the police unit under the supervision of
a . . . police officer.” The second is that the Department lacked the power to grant immunity. THE
KNAPP COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 246–48. These last two factors made the Department of
Investigations not truly independent of the Police Department.
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misdirected that they were almost totally ineffective in rooting out
corrupt policemen.”71
2. “Psycho Serpico”
Under this fragmented and dysfunctional anticorruption system, it
would predictably be a time-consuming job for any policeman of
integrity and courage to successfully reveal a corruption case to the head
of the department. This is exactly the unfortunate story of Frank Serpico,
who began his quixotic fight against police corruption in July 1966 as a
plainclothesman in the NYPD and left the force in June 1972. All that
Serpico ever wanted was to be a good cop.72
When Serpico got an unexpected share of a “pad” in July 1966, he
was concerned about being involved with dirty money, and reported the
corruption to someone who would launch an investigation. Ironically,
when Serpico handed in his corruption report to the captain at the
Department of Investigation, he was warned that people revealed by
Serpico would find him “face-down in the East River.”73 In the following
years, through different channels, Serpico tried very hard to appeal to the
First Deputy Commissioner, who was widely believed to be truly
managing the NYPD at the time, in order to initiate a systematic
investigation into the widespread corruption in the department. But the
result was disappointing. Not only was his request rejected again and
again, but Frank Serpico himself was regarded as a “psycho” by several
high-level officers.74
3. The Knapp Commission investigation
Eventually, with the support of three other colleagues, Serpico went
to The New York Times in 1970. On April 25, 1970, The New York Times
publicized an accusation of widespread corruption in the police
department. Under a front-page headline, The Times reported: “Graft
paid to police here, said to run into millions.” The story “created a
sensation, and for weeks at a stretch police corruption and police shakeups were page-one topics in The Times, The New York Daily News, and
The New York Post, and nightly leads on television and radio
broadcasts.”75
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 205.
PETER MAAS, SERPICO 11–12, 313 (Bantam Books 1973).
Id. at 133.
Id. at 186, 256, 258, 268, 308, 309.
Id. at 259.
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As a quick response to public pressure provoked by this story, a
committee was appointed by Mayor Lindsay, with the City Corporation
Counsel at its head. However, the pressure from the public and the press
was so much that, out of a concern of possibility of conflicts of interest,
this City Hall-dominated committee was replaced by a new independent
commission chaired by a Wall Street lawyer named Whiteman Knapp.
The Knapp Commission was established in May 1970, almost four years
after Frank Serpico first tried to get City Hall to investigate police
corruption.
Rather than seeking evidence for criminal charges against individual
police officers, the main function of the Knapp Commission
“concentrated on the broader problem of identifying the nature and
extent of corruption in the Department.”76 Having struggled to survive
from lack of financial resources, the Commission submitted its final
report in December 1972 after a series of investigations and public
hearings. Not surprisingly, in the first sentence of its report, the
commission said, “We found corruption to be widespread.”77 According
to the report, corrupt police officers in the NYPD had been described as
falling into two basic categories: “meat-eaters” and “grass-eaters.” As the
names suggest, the meat-eaters were those police officers who
aggressively abused their powers for personal benefits; the grass-eaters
simply accepted the payoffs that the circumstances of police work would
throw their way. Corrupt cops not only took “scores”—individual
payments—but also were widely involved in “pads”, by which they
collected regular bi-weekly or monthly payments from each of the
gambling establishments in the area under their jurisdiction, and divided
the dirty money in equal shares. The department had not eliminated this
misconduct because of the wide acceptance of the “rotten-apple” theory.
The premise of the theory, believed by many high-ranking officers, was
that corruption within the force was the exception rather than the rule.
Even worse, the rotten-apple doctrine reinforced and gave respectability
to the “blue code of silence” that was popular among ordinary police
officers.78
It was the task of the Knapp Commission to expose the myth of the
rotten apple doctrine. The Commission urged the state and city
governments to set up a detailed plan that would dismantle the
infrastructure of corruption that existed within the force. The first part of
the Commission’s plan took the position that a basic weakness in the
existing approaches to police corruption was that all agencies relied
76. THE KNAPP COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 36.
77. Id. at 1.
78. Id. at 1–10.
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primarily on police officers to do their investigative work, which caused
distrust among those citizens who wished to complain about police
officers. Accordingly, the Commission recommended that the Governor
of the State of New York appoint a Special Deputy Attorney General in
charge of investigating and prosecuting all crimes involving corruption
in the criminal process. A second part of the Commission’s plan was to
improve anticorruption action in the police department by strengthening
administrative accountability. In the meanwhile, all those fragmented
anticorruption units within the force were to be centralized and brought
together under the Inspection Services Bureau (“ISB”). Other
recommendations included strategies of reducing the opportunities for
corruption activity, reducing the temptations and increasing the risks, and
changing procedures that encourage corruption.
4. The Murphy reformation
Some of the recommendations from the Knapp Commission—for
example, the suggestion of setting up a Special Deputy Attorney General
in charge of anticorruption affairs—were never put into effect because of
the opposition from the city’s five district attorneys.79 Other
recommendations were implemented by the new Police Commissioner.
In contrast to the external institutional establishment of the ICAC in
Hong Kong, most reforms in NYC were related to internal organizational
rebuilding of the police force. Five months after the corruption story by
The New York Times, in October 1970, Mayor Lindsay replaced Police
Commissioner Leary with Patrick V. Murphy, who was a former head of
the New York Police Academy and then the Detroit Chief of Police.
Murphy had a reputation rare among police officers: that of a “law-andorder liberal.”80
Later developments of the police scandal had proved that
Commissioner Murphy was a sincere and successful reformer of the
police force.81 During his three-year commissionership at the NYPD
(October 1970 – May 1973), Murphy launched tremendous reforms in
the force, including decentralizing authority and responsibility, reducing
the autonomy of the detective branch, setting new standards of
accountability for senior officers, instigating proactive investigatory
procedures for police deviance, altering certain aspects of enforcement,
79. VINCENT J. CANNATO, THE
TO SAVE NEW YORK 475–76 (2001).

UNGOVERNABLE CITY: JOHN LINDSAY AND HIS STRUGGLE

80. See MAAS, supra note 72, at 273.
81. See generally PATRICK V. MURPHY & THOMAS PLATE, COMMISSIONER: A VIEW FROM
THE TOP OF AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1977).
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rotating personnel, and emphasizing integrity in training.82 As for the
new system, Murphy himself interpreted it as the following:
This was the essence of accountability: not passing the buck. And
the essence of good police management: knowing what was going on
under your command. It was either corruption or incompetence, one or
the other.
Under the old system, the commanding officer could have feigned
insulation. Under the reform, we were insisting on greater
accountability, knowledgeability, professionalism.83

With regard to the reforms by Murphy, Jerome H. Skolnick, a former
president of the American Society of Criminology, has commented:
Thus Murphy’s success in New York probably had more to do with his
own extraordinary personal ability, energy, and broad experience than
with the fact that he came from a line of New York cops. He was the
ideal reformer: a savvy insider who had been away learning about
police life in other places before returning to reform the agency in
84
which he had grown up.

5. Reversion
The Murphy reformation of the NYPD should not be evaluated
unilaterally. On the one hand, it is quite fair to conclude that the
immediate effect of those reforms was promising. Some serious
academic research on the reforms soon after the event indicated huge
achievements. Leading scholars in the field of police corruption have
paid much attention to it. Lawrence Sherman, for example, remarked,
“From all indications, the most recent episode of scandal and reform in
the New York City Police Department . . . reduced police corruption to a
very minimal level.”85 Maurice Punch, in a number of informal
interviews with members of the NYPD conducted in the early 1980s, was
told that the reform was revolutionary.86 Not only academic research but
also the public media reached the same conclusion. On November 29,
82. See MAURICE PUNCH, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF POLICE
DEVIANCE AND CONTROL 22-28 (1985); see generally John Dombrink, The Touchables: Vice and
Police Corruption in the 1980’s, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Winter 1988, at 201–32.
83. MURPHY & PLATE, supra note 81, at 167.
84. JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE
USE OF FORCE 185 (2002).
85. SHERMAN, supra note 13, at xxix.
86. PUNCH, supra note 82, at 28.
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1982, The New York Times, in an article named “Decade after Knapp
Inquiry, A Sense of ‘Revolution’ Pervades Police Force”, said, “[T]he
last 10 years have brought a profound change in the department’s attitude
toward corruption – a change reflected in the behavior not only of senior
officials but also many officers on the street.”87
However, negative evidence persisted. Even during Murphy’s
commissionership, police corruption was never fully stopped.88 In 1986,
when 12 police officers from the 77th Precinct of the NYPD were
involved in another police scandal, the issue of anticorruption was once
again put back on the table.89 But after that scandal, the NYPD enjoyed a
period of quiet regarding corruption until the early 1990s. On July 24,
1992, responding to a new police scandal, Mayor Dinkins issued
Executive Order No. 42 to establish another independent investigation
commission, the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police
Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police
Department. This commission was chaired by Judge Milton Mollen.
According to the Executive Order, the Mollen Commission “was asked
to examine three areas of deep public concern: (1) the extent and nature
of corruption within the NYPD; (2) the NYPD’s policies and procedures
for corruption control; and (3) improvements and reform for the
detection and prevention of corruption within the NYPD.”90
The final report of the Commission in 1994 stated that the NYPD
was still grappling with the corruption problem precisely twenty years
after the Knapp Commission Investigation.91

87. M.A. Farber, Decade after Knapp Inquiry, A Sense of ‘Revolution’ Pervades Police
Force, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1982, at B1.
88. In a historical review of police corruption in 1986, The New York Times enumerated
several major police corruption cases after the Murphy reformation in the 1970s. In 1981,
[f]ive officers from the 10th Precinct in the Chelsea section of Manhattan were sent to jail
for taking bribes and 11 supervisors were disciplined by the department for being
unaware of the corrupt activity. [In] 1983[, a]fter an undercover Federal inquiry into
possible organized crime connections, 10 officers from the 10th Precinct were charged
with accepting bribes from after hours [sic] clubs in Greenwich Village and on the Lower
East Side. [In] 1985[, f]ive officers in the 106th Precinct in South Ozone Park, Queens,
[were] accused of torturing drug suspects with a stun gun . . . . Two of the officers were
eventually convicted and trials for the other three are pending. Police Commissioner
Benjamin Ward transferred every supervisor in the 106th Precinct.
Police Corruption: A Look at History, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1986, at B4.
89. See Todd S. Purdum, 12 from 77th Precinct Arraigned; Ward Outlines Integrity
Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1986, at A1; Dombrink, supra note 82, at 219; see generally MIKE
MACLARY, BUDDY BOYS: WHEN GOOD COPS TURN BAD (1987).
90. Baer and Armao, supra note 277, at 74 (citing N.Y., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 42 (July 24,
1992)).
91. See generally THE MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 9.
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IV. THE BLUE CODE OF SILENCE, CHECKS & BALANCES, AND POLICE
CORRUPTION CONTROL
With the foregoing background of scandals, investigations, reforms,
and results of police corruption control in the two cities, this article will
now analyze the factors contributing to different results in the cases and
then present a mechanism that enables successful control of police
corruption.
A. Empirical Findings and Their Theoretical Implications
Before moving into detailed scrutiny of the mechanism, it’s useful to
summarize the empirical findings from the previous case study. In
principle, the Hong Kong account is a successful case of controlling
police corruption, while the 1970s NYC account represents a relatively
failed attempt at controlling corruption in the long run. Throughout the
process of reform leading to these different results, similarities and
differences between the two cases are readily apparent.
On one hand, both cases involve (1) a police scandal, (2) an
independent investigation into the scandal, (3) a finding of organized
police corruption by the investigator, (4) a new policy-entrepreneur
police commissioner appointed soon after the scandal, and (5) a
systematic organizational rebuilding within the police force enforced by
the new police commissioner. Nevertheless, the two cases vary in the
following aspects: (1) the existence of institutionalized checks and
balances within the NYC political structure but not within Hong Kong,
(2) an external-reform approach in the Hong Kong case but not in the
NYC case, and (3) a severe punishment of the corrupt police and later a
partial amnesty in Hong Kong but not in NYC.
What are the implications of these empirical findings? To explore
potential theoretical implications, it is helpful to introduce Mill’s method
of difference. Named after British philosopher John Stuart Mill, this
analytical tool deals with situations for which the outcome is not the
same for all compared cases.92 To use this method,
the researcher examines all possible independent variables that might
influence th[e] outcome, looking for a pattern where only one of the
independent variables is perfectly correlated with the dependent
variable, whereas the other independent variables are either constant

92. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE
(Obscure Press 2004) (1843).
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(regardless of shifts in the dependent variable) or imperfectly correlated
with the dependent variable.93

According to this method, the one “perfectly correlated” independent
variable is assumed to be responsible for the different outcomes.
While Mill’s method of difference is not perfect in social research
and its application is conditional on many prerequisites,94 it is
illuminating for comparative studies, including this comparison between
Hong Kong and NYC. Accordingly, without claiming a single
deterministic-causal relation, I contend that the above three major
differences regarding the process of reform between the two cases might
contribute to the different results of anticorruption in the two cities.
Specifically, there are three relationships found in the previous
empirical study. First, the establishment of the ICAC, an independent
institution with the power of investigation and prosecution, was a
necessary condition for the wide and severe prosecution of the corrupt
police officers in Hong Kong, which later caused the police mutiny and
eventually culminated in partial amnesty. On the other hand, the NYPD,
which continued to effectively control the power of investigating
corruption cases, did not make an overall attack on itself. This
comparison, along with the relationship between vigorous prosecution
and reform, is obvious and therefore not treated extensively in this
article. The second explanation is that the establishment of an
independent institution checking on the police force is a precondition for
changing the equilibrium of police corruption. Thirdly, the existence of
institutionalized checks and balances within the political structure will
stand in the way of establishing such an independent institution. This
article explores the last two relationships in the parts B and C, below.
B. The Blue Code of Silence and Insufficiency of Internal Reforms
As mentioned above, the comparative case study of reform efforts in
Hong Kong and NYC shows that an internal rebuilding within the police
force is not sufficient to build up a new equilibrium of police integrity.
Instead, an external institution checking on the police force is necessary

93. Stanley Lieberson, Small N’s and Big Conclusions: An Examination of Reasoning in
Comparative Studies Based on A Small Number of Cases, 70 SOCIAL FORCES 307, 307–20 (1991), at
312.
94. See Elizabeth Nicholas, Skocpol and Revolution: Comparative Analysis vs. Historical
Conjuncture, 9 COMP. SOC. RES. 163, 170–175 (1986).

185]

POLICE CORRUPTION CONTROL

213

for controlling police corruption in the long run. Why? One major reason
is that police corruption is usually organized.95
Another factor is related to a universal subculture within the police
force, the blue code of silence. As the name suggests, the blue code of
silence refers to a police subculture of keeping silent regarding fellow
officers’ unethical behavior. The code has widely been found by
investigations throughout the world, including recent investigations
performed in west European cities, such as Amsterdam; 96 east European
cities, such as Zagreb;97 Australian cities, such as Queensland;98 and
North American cities, such as Los Angeles.99 It was also discovered in
the above cases of Hong Kong100 and NYC.101
These two reasons (lack of external checks and the blue code of
silence) are significantly interrelated and share the same etiology.
According to Skolnick, the blue code of silence is developed in the
following way:
To fulfill their mandate, police work is done in unpredictable and
sometimes violent environments. Given the potential danger of their
workplaces coupled with their authority to use force to overcome
resistance, police develop a close-knit substructure, with its own
demands and expectations. Loyalty to fellow officers is a key feature of
the culture of policing, regardless of whether criminality is
evolved . . . .
The notion of loyalty to fellow officers is first encountered by
police officers in their Police Academies, and this sense of loyalty
tends to be reinforced throughout officers’ careers . . . .
The refusal to report misconduct to proper authorities, or falsely
claim no knowledge of misconduct, is a common manifestation of these

95. Id. at 3–56.
96. See PUNCH, supra note 82, at 155–156.
97. See Sanja Kutnjak-Ivkovic et al., Controlling Police Corruption: The Croatian
Perspective, in POLICING CORRUPTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 259 (Rick Sarre et al. eds.,
2005).
98. See David Brereton, and Andrew Ede, The Police Code of Silence in Queensland: The
Impact of the Fitzgerald Inquiry Reforms, 8 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 107 (1996-1997).
99. See WARREN CHRISTOPHER, REPORT FF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 168 (1991).
100. See generally BLAIR-KERR, supra note 9; Tak-sing Cheung & Chong-chor Lau, A Profile
of Syndicate Corruption in the Police Force, in CORRUPTION AND ITS CONTROL IN HONG KONG 199
(Rance Lee ed., 1981).
101. See generally THE MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 9; THE KNAPP COMMISSION, supra
note 9.
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sentiments. Another is providing false testimony—“falsification”—to
102
cover up or support the misdeeds of fellow police officers.

Actually, not only covering up for fellow officers but also joining
them in committing misconduct is a good way to securing police
officers’ loyalty; in fact, the latter is more efficient. Not surprisingly,
reports on both Hong Kong103 and NYC104 have found very few
policemen in each setting who refused to join in the corruption syndicate
or “pad” in a certain division. In contrast, disclosing their fellow officers’
misconduct is a risky business.
The code is not only popular among ordinary police officers but also
commanders. Commanders tolerate their subordinates’ misconduct
simply because their patronage for their subordinates is a source for
building authority. As a result, it is not uncommon for the police to
regard the relation between them and the public as one of “us versus
them.” As two members of the Mollen Commission have reported,
At the Police Academy, an officer testified, he had learned that cops
were different from the society they police, that the police are “us” and
the public is “them” – that a cop must be prepared to do anything for
himself and his comrades to insure that “them” never get the better of
105
“us.”

Influenced by the perception of “us versus them,” bosses of the force
always want to “clean their own laundry” when corruption is detected.
But, it is almost impossible for them to launch a real campaign against
corruption within the force because of the blue code of silence. In this
sense, it is not surprising to find that both Commissioner Sutcliffe and
Commissioner Murphy, men of great integrity, did not accept any
external intervention into police corruption, because they were concerned
how it would affect the morale of the force.
In other words, because of the uniqueness of police work and the
particular subculture of the blue code of silence, internal organizational
rebuilding is not sufficient to change the equilibrium of police
corruption. This point is well demonstrated by the two cases. In
particular, the Mollen Commission of NYC gave the same conclusion in
its final report in 1994, which was a reflection of the eventual failure of
102. Jerome H. Skolnick, Corruption and the Blue Code of Silence, in POLICING CORRUPTION:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 302 (internal citation omitted).
103. Cheung & Lau, supra note 100, at 205.
104. See generally MAAS, supra note 72.
105. Baer and Armao, supra note 277, at 80.
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the Murphy reformation. “The Commission urged the NYPD to
undertake a dual-track approach to improving police integrity. The first
track focused on the NYPD’s internal operations; the second, on the
creation of an outside monitor that would insure the vigilance and
commitment of the NYPD’s own efforts to stop corruption” in the long
run.106 And as a matter of fact, the necessity of an independent
organization for police corruption control is not unique to the two cases.
At the Seventh United Nations Congress on Prevention of Crime and
Treatment of Offenders, several participants, including Australia, Brazil,
England, Nigeria, and the United States emphasized the need for
external, independent corruption control.107
C. Two Faces of Checks and Balances
The previous discussion establishes that an independent institution
like the ICAC is necessary to ensure a new equilibrium of police
integrity. The questions then are: Why have so many cities not adopted
this approach? Why did City Hall in NYC not adopt the suggestion from
the Mollen Commission? Clearly, a good suggestion of strategies is not
sufficient to implement a good public policy. The enforcement of any
public policy is significantly constrained by the political structure in
which decision-makers are performing. Probing the success of the Hong
Kong case signals a new phase of analysis, namely, examining what it
takes to establish an independent institution like the ICAC.
Establishing an independent institution is essentially the building of a
new power center that will inevitably usurp some powers of the police
force and then perform as its external monitor. Some organizational and
institutional blockages have to be overcome before this can be done. The
first blockage is an inevitable opposition from the police force. Another
blockage is the problem of locating the principal for the new power
center: the proposed independent institution should certainly be
independent of the police force on the one hand, but on the other hand, it
should certainly not be independent of certain higher authority, such as
the city hall, the city council, or the people. After all, the establishment
of a powerful anticorruption institution is about redistributing powers
within the whole political structure.
In modern municipal politics built upon civil service, the first
blockage is less significant than the second one. In most cities, either
with or without fair selections, police officers are directly or indirectly

106. Id. at 83.
107. Das, supra note 1, at 5.
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responsible to the police commissioner, who is appointed by the chief
executive of the city. As long as the city leadership shows a great resolve
to fight against corruption, the opposition from the police force can
eventually be overcome. However, if there are institutionalized checks
and balances among different branches, the setting of a new power center
has to and will be a constitutional problem. Once a constitutional debate
is provoked, the debate on the legitimacy of this new power center will
take place prior to the discussion of efficiency in terms of implementing
public policies, as illustrated by the following chapter in the NYC case.
After the strong recommendation from the Mollen Commission in
1994, the City Council of New York did try to create an outside monitor,
which was named the Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board,
with Local Law 13 of 1995. According to the law, the board would be
empowered to “undertake independent investigations of possible
corruption within the police department” (§451-a) and be supported by
the power of issuing subpoenas (§451-b). But, soon after the
promulgation of the law, the mayor vetoed this legislation. He believed
that it violated the principle of separation of powers granted by the city
charter. The mayor argued that all executive powers should be put in the
hands of the executive branch but not the legislature, and that the
independent investigation into police corruption was a consummately
executive power. When the case was presented to the Supreme Court of
New York County, the court ruled in favor of the executive branch.108 As
a result, the Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board was never
created.109
A third institutional blockage to the establishment of an independent
institution is related to a dilemma of governmental accountability in
democracies. In principle, a system of periodical elections is a good
measure to improve accountability by removing irresponsible politicians.
Concerned with reelection, elected officials try to maintain a good public
image as much as possible. In the case of police scandals, an elected
mayor faces a dilemma: on one hand, he had better show his prompt and
sincere commitment to fighting against corruption by appointing an
investigating commission; on the other, however, he also hopes that the
police force will not pose trouble for him.
108. See Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, 651 N.Y.S.2d 531 (App. Div. 2007)
(affirming the order of the Supreme Court of New York County granting the mayor’s motion for
summary judgment).
109. Nevertheless, City Hall itself did establish, on its own behalf, an independent committee
to monitor police corruption. This is called the Commission to Combat Police Corruption (“CCPC”),
and is a permanent board to monitor and evaluate the anti-corruption programs, activities,
commitment, and efforts of the NYPD. But, compared to the proposed Independent Police
Investigation and Audit Board, the CCPC’s power is significantly reduced.
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In practice, however, a true campaign against widespread police
corruption usually does pose trouble for the current mayor, as evidenced
by the NYC history. This shows a negative correlation between the
commitment to anticorruption and reelectability. In fact, no mayor of
NYC who has launched an independent investigation into a police
scandal has been re-elected in the past century.110 Smart politicians can
learn much from the reading of history and Mayor Lindsay took this
lesson seriously. Vincent J. Cannato, the author of the only substantial
biography of Mayor Lindsay, stated, “Having been beaten badly over the
issue of the [Civilian Complaint Review Board] and fearing that any
investigation into corruption would completely sever whatever goodwill
remained with the police, Lindsay and his aides chose to ignore the
charges of corruption.”111
In short, an elected mayor has to face the dilemma of earning and
losing points when he commits to investigating corruption within his
own agencies. This makes him hesitate to move forward with a campaign
of anticorruption. Thus, a certain version of the prisoner’s dilemma arises
in democracies battling corruption.112 This dilemma reduces the mayor’s
incentive to disclose police corruption. Since the job of disclosing police
corruption could be done well by an external independent institution, the
mayor will also hesitate to push the establishment of such an institution
forward.
The NYC case proves the thesis of the “improper influence” of
checks and balances in curbing corruption.113 In particular, the negative
influences came from the separation of powers between the City Hall and
the City Council, two-party politics, and the interaction between the two.
Another example that illustrates this point is related to the dysfunction of
the Department of Investigations. According to the law, the Department
was authorized to investigate governmental problems in any agency on
behalf of the city, including police corruption. But it did not work well,
in part because it could not compel a reluctant witness to testify by
giving him immunity. As a matter of fact, the Department did try hard to
get this power by introducing bills into the legislature, but it failed to do
so.114
In contrast, in the Hong Kong colonial government, most powers
were centralized and controlled by the governor. It was much more

110. Chin, supra note 28.
111. See CANNATO, supra note 79, at 466.
112. Cf. Barbara Geddes, A Game-Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American
Democracies, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV., 371, 371–92 (1991).
113. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 143.
114. THE KNAPP COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 247.
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convenient for him to mobilize all resources to eliminate police
corruption without significant institutionalized blockages. As for the
establishment of the ICAC, it did usurp substantial power from the police
force, and that led to a much more vehement opposition from the Hong
Kong police force than its counterpart in NYC. But, from the perspective
of the governor, those redistributed powers were just shifted from his left
pocket to his right pocket, with the Legislative Council neither getting
nor losing anything. Essentially, nothing had been changed for the
governor. It is therefore understandable that Sir MacLehose strongly
repudiated the status quo approach proposed by the Police Commissioner
because of the pressure from the public and the media.
Leaving the problem of legitimacy aside for a while, the efficiency
of an autocratic power is also apparent from the example of partial
amnesty. This amnesty was indeed controversial and widely criticized.115
But, as Melanie Manion points out, it had certain positive practical
results that significantly contributed to the consolidation of the ICAC. 116
Given the controversial understanding of the amnesty, it could have
never happened if the governor had been an elected official.
In summary, through these cases, we find the double edges of the
“sword”—the mechanism of checks and balances in governance. On the
one hand, the lack of external checks on the police force is conducive to
widespread corruption within the force. In order to deal with this
problem in the long run, it is necessary for reformers to rely on an
external institutionalized power. In this sense, the pursuit of the
equilibrium of police integrity is a pursuit of better checks and balances
in government. On the other hand, this aim can be better achieved in a
regime without an institutionalized mechanism of checks and balances,
especially in relation to the executive branch. This is the dilemma of
checks and balances in combating police corruption and in governance.
V. CONCLUSION
The above comparative study neither tries to develop certain
universal and single-dimensional explanations for the success of police
corruption control in cities, nor gives a deterministic-causal analysis on
the relation between institutional factors and the outcome of police
corruption control. Obviously, reasons conducive to successful constraint
on police corruption in the long run are multi-dimensional. The few
successful cases of police anticorruption policies throughout the world in
115. Peter Wesley-Smith, Graft Amnesty and the Law, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 30, 1977, at
24.
116. MANION, supra note 5, at 41.
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past decades, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, do not share the exact
same model.117
Rather, this article has the less ambitious goal of showing some hints
for answering the questions raised in the introduction. With support of
our empirical survey, we conclude that some city governments, such as
Hong Kong, have succeeded in combating police corruption partly
because they have made a better choice of anticorruption policies than
those cities that have failed, such as NYC. In particular, one important
lesson for future policy-makers is that police corruption control cannot
solely rely on the police force itself. This wisdom is demonstrated by
many other cases, as well. The basic reason is that corruption within the
police force is usually widespread and organized, and has been
reinforced by certain police subcultures, such as the blue code of silence.
Such subcultures make the equilibrium of police corruption easy to build
up but hard to change.
Therefore, the establishment of an independent organization to
monitor, investigate and prosecute, and prevent police corruption is
necessary for long-term reform. Such an approach acknowledges the
inefficiency of a routine-and-incremental anticorruption approach and
the priority of a mobilizing-and-comprehensive anticorruption policy.118
The latter approach refers to a policy of mobilizing more resources and
centralizing more powers in order to win the fight against corruption.
This is a reasonable solution in that a stable equilibrium of police
corruption, by definition, cannot be easily achieved by fragmented forces
in routine ways.
The establishment of the ICAC in Hong Kong demonstrates well the
efficiency of such an approach by taking powers from the police force
and checking the police force institutionally at the same time. In this
sense, the success of police corruption control is an outgrowth of a
successful pursuit of checks and balances in governance. Once the old
equilibrium of police corruption is broken, the institutionalized external
checks on the police force make the consolidation of the new equilibrium
of police integrity easy.
However, this comparative study also shows that the pursuit of
additional checks and balances in governance can be negatively affected
by the existing checks and balances among political players. Ironically, it
is more efficient for a centralized autocratic power to do this job. As
Susan Rose-Ackerman remarks, “[T]he fragmentation of political power

117. See Jon S. T. Quah, Controlling Corruption in City-States: A Comparative Study of Hong
Kong and Singapore, 22 CRIME, LAW & SOC. CHANGE 391 (1995).
118. See id. at 408.
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[in democracies] is not necessarily effective.”119 This is a true dilemma
of checks and balances in combating police corruption.
Nevertheless, this dilemma by no means leads us to conclude that the
mechanism of checks and balances is useless and even deleterious to
good governance. Rather, the case study tries to provoke a reflection of a
fundamental cost-benefit analysis of checks and balances in democracies.
This paper contends that it is reasonable for political players to impose
checks on checks and balances in certain circumstances, which could be
a note in the literature of the relationship between corruption control on
one side and democratization and decentralization on the other.

119. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 143.

